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Attorney–client privilege is one of the most important aspects of our 
legal system. It is one of the oldest privileges in American law and is 
codified both at the national and state level. Applying to both individual 
persons and corporations, this expanded privilege covers a wide breadth 
of clients.  However, this broad privilege can sometimes become blurred 
in relationships between the corporation and the individuals it serves. 
Specifically, insurance companies and those they cover have complex 
relationships, as the insurer possesses a quasi-fiduciary relationship in 
relation to the insured. This type of relationship requires that the insurer 
act in good faith towards its insured, giving equal weight to its own 
interests as well as the insured’s. When attorneys become involved in the 
claim-handling process—usually advising insurers about whether to 
accept or deny a claim—it is often difficult to determine whether the 
attorney is acting in an investigative capacity, thus merely a factual one, 
or in contemplation of litigation, thus a privileged and protected one. The 
separation of these duties is an important determination to make, 
especially in the event of a bad faith action. When an insured makes a bad 
faith claim against their insurer, presumably for fraudulently denying their 
claim, the insured would naturally be entitled to its claim file—the only 
documentation of its own claim assessment—right? Unfortunately, no 
uniform answer to that question exists in federal or state law. The insurer 
will likely claim attorney–client privilege to protect those documents, and 
the insured will likely seek to either pierce that privilege or to altogether 
abrogate it. And, to complicate matters further, different jurisdictions 
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apply different standards and privilege exceptions in these difficult 
situations. Due to the fact that a large number of insurance companies are 
national entities that conduct business across various states, a uniform 
standard for addressing attorney–client privilege in insurance bad faith 
actions is paramount. Washington courts have imposed a presumption of 
no attorney–client privilege in insurance bad faith actions, recognizing the 
necessity of broad discovery and highlighting the importance of good faith 
in the often-unequal relationship between an insurer and its insured. It is 
this presumption that is recommended be nationally recognized by 
codifying it in either the federal rules, a national act, or adding an 
exception to the model rules of professional conduct, in order to promote 




I. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................1304 
A. Claimant Status ...........................................................................1305 
B. Pre-Cedell Presumption ..............................................................1306 
II. THE CEDELL PRESUMPTION ............................................................1308 
A. Post-Cedell Application ..............................................................1310 
1. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Justus ................................1311 
2. Leahy v. State Farm Auto Insurance .......................................1312 
B. Cedell and Statutory Authority....................................................1314 
III. EXTRA JURISDICTIONAL INSURANCE CLAIM PRIVILEGES .............1315 
A. Paralleling and Adopting the Cedell Presumption .....................1316 
1. Idaho ........................................................................................1316 
2. Alaska ......................................................................................1319 
3. Illinois ......................................................................................1319 
4. Ohio .........................................................................................1320 
5. Florida ......................................................................................1321 
6. Montana ...................................................................................1323 
B. Distinguishing or Rejecting Cedell .............................................1324 
1. Hawaii ......................................................................................1324 
2. West Virginia ...........................................................................1325 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................1326 
A. Proposed Codified Federal Rule of Evidence .............................1327 
B. Proposed Provisions to UCSPA ..................................................1328 
C. Proposed Provision to Rules of Professional Conduct ...............1329 
 
2020] The Cedell Presumption 1301 
INTRODUCTION 
Attorney–client privilege has a long standing and important role in 
the legal system. It is the oldest privilege protecting confidential 
communications in common law,1 and has been codified both in the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct2 and statutes in every state.3 Its purpose is 
“to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of 
law and administration of justice.”4 A lawyer’s ability to be fully informed 
by the client of the facts and issues of a matter is paramount to providing 
sound legal advice and advocacy.5 The hallmark of the attorney–client 
relationship is trust.6 The client must be able to “communicate fully and 
frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging 
subject matter”; the lawyer requires this information to effectively 
 
 1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)); see also Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070 
(1978) (“[R]eported decisions involving the privilege begin in 1654.”). 
 2. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 3. See Ala. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); Alaska Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2017); 
Ariz. Rules of Prof’l Conduct ER 1.6 (2015); Ark. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); Cal. Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct r. 3-100 (2018); Colo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Conn. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); Del. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2013); D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 
(2007): Fla. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4-1.6 (2015); Ga. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4-201 (2018); 
Haw. Ex. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); Idaho Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2004); Ill. Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Ind. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2005); Iowa Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 32:1.6 (2005); Kan. 226 Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); Ky. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
r. 3.130 (2009); La. Bar art. 16 Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); Me. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 
1.6 (2015); Md. Att’y r. 19-301.6 (2016); Mass. S. Ct. r. 3:07 Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); 
Mich. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2019); Minn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2019); Miss. Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); Mo. Bar r. 4-1.6 (2005); Mont. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2017); 
Neb. E R. Prof’l Conduct § 3-501.6 (2017); Nev. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); N.H. Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); N.J. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2018); N.M. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
r. 16-106 (2013); N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2019); N.C. Bar Ch. 2, r. 1.6 (2017); N.D. Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Ohio Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2013); Okla. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Or. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2003); Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 
(2018); R.I. S. Ct. Art. V Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2007); S.C. A. Ct. r. 407 Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); S.D. Rules of Prof’l Conduct App. Ch. 16-18 r. 1.6 (2018); Tenn. S. Ct. r. 8, 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2017); Tex. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.05 (1991); Utah Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2017); Vt. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2009); Va. S. Ct. Pt. 6 § 2 Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Wash. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2018); W. Va. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); Wis. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 20:1.6 (2017); Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 
1.6 (2014). 
 4. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6, cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (explaining that 
with this trust the client is encouraged to “communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer” even in 
regard to potentially damaging topics, in which the lawyer needs to effectively represent and advise 
the client). 
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represent and advise the client.7 This privilege most importantly “prohibits 
disclosure of confidential communications.”8 Not only is this privilege 
significant within the legal system, it is also widely recognized and 
referenced in social aspects of society.9 
The attorney–client privilege generally applies when four elements10 
are present. First, the holder asserting the privilege is seeking or has sought 
to be a client. Second, the person to which the communication was made 
is a member of the jurisdiction’s respective bar, and the communication is 
made pursuant to that person’s role as an attorney. Third, the 
communication is related to facts the client confidentially communicated 
to the attorney (i.e., not in the presence of third parties), and for the purpose 
of securing legal services, an opinion of law, or assistance in a legal 
proceeding. And fourth, the privilege is claimed and is not waived11 by the 
client.12 If these four elements are met, the privilege will generally apply. 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, 3 SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7.05 (5th ed. 
Supp. 2018). 
 9. To illustrate how famous this rule is in America’s culture and understanding of the legal 
system, see the following discussions on how this privilege is conveyed in today’s current news and 
popular culture and how it is often criticized in its depiction in popular television shows: Jessica 
Levinson, How Don Jr.’s Ridiculous Claim About Attorney-Client Privilege Could Actually Work, 
NBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/don-jr-s-ridiculous-claim-
about-attorney-client-privilege-could-ncna829986 [https://perma.cc/84XE-7VZS]; Kyle Swenson, 
Sean Hannity’s Idea of ‘Attorney-Client Privilege’ Was Right out of ‘Breaking Bad,’ WASH. POST 
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/04/17/sean-hannitys-
idea-of-attorney-client-privilege-is-right-out-of-breaking-bad-its-also-
wrong/?utm_term=.e5e4214538b6 [https://perma.cc/SEX2-UX9T]; Anna Codrea-Rado, What Real 
Lawyers Think About Breaking Bad–and Why It Should Be Taught in Class, THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2015/may/22/what-real-lawyers-think-about-
breaking-bad [https://perma.cc/QDT4-VPVV]; Nicole Bitette, Attorney-Client Privilege Isn’t All That 
Saul Goodman Made It Out to Be, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nydailynews. 
com/entertainment/tv/don-saul-goodman-advice-attorney-client-privilege-article-1.3926005 
[https://perma.cc/UF4T-RAYD]; Harry Graff, Standard of Review: On ‘Suits,’ Attorney-Client 
Privilege No Longer Exists, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 22, 2016), https://abovethelaw.com 
/2016/09/standard-of-review-on-suits-attorney-client-privilege-no-longer-exists/?rf=1 [https://perma. 
cc/DQZ3-UQAW]. 
 10. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950). 
 11. Attorney–client privilege may be either express or implied; even if a client did not intend to 
waive his or her attorney–client privilege, “the client’s failure to take reasonable precautions to 
preserve the confidentiality of attorney–client communications can result in the destruction of [the 
client’s] privilege protection.” PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
§ 9.22 (2017). See generally FED. R. EVID. 502. For more information on implied waiver and 
jurisdictional tests regarding the required conditions to be met to impliedly waive privilege, see Steven 
Plitt & Joshua D. Rogers, The Battle to Define the Scope of Attorney–Client Privilege in the Context 
of Insurance Company Bad Faith: A Judicial War Zone, 14 U.N.H. L. REV. 105, 110–14 (2016). 
 12. Id. 
2020] The Cedell Presumption 1303 
The attorney–client privilege extends not only to natural persons but 
also to corporate clients.13 In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the “control group” test, which limited the claim 
of privilege to officers and agents who were responsible for the company’s 
actions and extended that privilege to all employees.14 Thus, this expanded 
privilege applies to cover all individuals who have pertinent information 
needed by the attorney to properly advise and represent the corporate 
client. This Comment will focus on insurance companies as corporate 
clients who invoke the attorney–client privilege. Generally, no insured-
insurer specific privilege exists to protect communications between an 
insured and its liability or indemnity insurer. Instead, the privilege 
commonly invoked to protect such communications is the ever-important 
attorney–client privilege. 
Insurance claims, specifically, raise interesting and important 
questions regarding attorney–client privilege, considering the relationship 
between the insurer and the insured. In insurance actions, the insurer has 
a “quasi-fiduciary” relationship with the insured.15 This quasi-fiduciary 
relationship requires the insurer to act in good faith towards its insured and 
“imposes on the insurer ‘a broad obligation of fair dealing . . . and a 
responsibility to give equal consideration to the insured’s interests.’”16 
Due to this relationship, when an attorney investigates the surrounding 
facts of a claim, “he or she owes a quasi-fiduciary duty to the insured.”17 
It is often difficult to determine whether the attorney was acting in an 
investigative capacity in relation to a claim or working in order to provide 
legal advice to the insurer in contemplation of litigation. 
In the investigative and adjustive capacity, the insurer–attorney is 
performing duties viewed as in furtherance of an ordinary business 
function and, thus, conducts a factual investigation.18 However, when an 
attorney for the insurance company works to obtain coverage for a claim 
or in preparation for an anticipated lawsuit, the attorney is within the role 
 
 13. See David Simon, The Attorney–Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 
953, 953–54 (1956). 
 14. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981). 
 15. A “true fiduciary” relationship would place the insured’s interests above the insurers. Thus, 
“something less than a fiduciary relationship exists between the insurer and the insured. Safeco Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 504 (1992) (citing Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 
1133 (Wash. 1986)). 
 16. Ian S. Birk, The Cedell Presumption: Discovery of the Insurer’s Claim File in Insurance Bad 
Faith Litigation in Washington, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 503, 513 (2014) (quoting Tank v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Wash. 1986)). 
 17. Dan D. Kohane, Sean Griffin & John R. Ewell, Invading the Sanctuary Practical Solutions 
to Fend Off the Attack on the Confidentiality of Insurer-Coverage Counsel Communications, 11 No. 
2 IN-HOUSE DEF. Q. 42 (2016). 
 18. Susan Page White, Attitude Adjustment Case Law Makes It Clear That the Attorney-Client 
Privilege Does Not Attach When an Attorney Acts as A Claims Adjuster, L.A. LAW. 18–20 (2010). 
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of legal counsel, representing the insurance company.19 The separation of 
these duties is paramount in determining whether any privilege applies in 
respect to those communications and claim files, especially because the 
privilege applies solely to the communications between the attorney and 
the client, and not the actual facts of the matter.20 
This Comment examines the relationship between the insurer and the 
insured in bad faith insurance claims regarding waiver of the critical 
attorney–client privilege and suggests a national framework for handling 
such waivers. Specifically, this Comment draws from the presumption 
standard used by Washington state—adopted in Cedell v. Farmers 
Insurance Co. of Washington—to develop a recommendation for a 
national standard amongst the ever-evolving jurisdictional differences.21 
Part I of this Comment discusses the background and ultimate 
application of the Cedell presumption in Washington state. Part II then 
examines Washington’s application of the Cedell presumption in relation 
to relevant privilege statutes, and how Washington courts have applied the 
presumption since its inception. Part III of this Comment examines states 
that have applied similar exceptions, and Part IV compares those  
states with similar exceptions to states refusing to apply any privilege 
exceptions or very limited ones. Finally, Part V will offer a potential 
national presumption modeled after Cedell to incorporate within the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in order to bring unity across states 
in this national issue. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Attorney–client privilege in the insurance context most often arises 
in connection with bad faith insurance claims. The Model Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA),22—drafted by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)—which has been 
adopted in almost every state,23 identifies what constitutes fair and unfair 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981). 
 21. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013). 
 22. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 1997). 
 23. Id. at ST-900-3–ST-300-6. States and territories  that have adopted the most recent UCSPA 
in a substantially similar model include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Manie, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Northern 
Marianas, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
States and territories currently without activity or adoption include: District of Columbia, Guam, Iowa, 
Mississippi, Nevada, and Virgin Islands. 
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coverage of claim practices.24 Under UCSPA, examples of unfair practices 
include “‘refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable 
investigation’ and ‘not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair 
and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has become 
reasonably clear.’”25 Courts view bad faith claims as originating in tort, 
applying the same principles as used in other tort actions in which the 
insured must show that an alleged breach of an insurance policy was 
unreasonable.26 For example, Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act27 
(IFCA) allows a first-party claimant who alleges an insurer unreasonably 
denied coverage of its claim to bring an action in court to recover damages 
actually sustained and attorney’s fees.28 
A. Claimant Status 
In bad faith insurance claims, courts treat claimants that are first 
parties, third parties, and underinsured or uninsured motorists (UIM) 
differently.29 A first-party claimant is generally an “individual, 
corporation, association, partnership, or other legal entity asserting a right 
to payment as a covered person under an insurance policy” or contract that 
arises out of a loss covered by the intended policy.30 A first-party claim 
weighs heavily on the quasi-fiduciary relationship between the insurer and 
the insured because the insurer is required to act in good faith and must 
 
 24. UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, ADVOCACY & ACTION PROGRAM, 50 STATE SURVEY OF BAD 
FAITH LAWS AND REMEDIES (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Final%20-%20Bad%20Faith%20Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YLK-QULL]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Onvia, Inc., 196 P.3d 664 (Wash. 2008); see also WASH. 
REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (2018). 
 27. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015 (2007). 
 28. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015(1) (2007). 
 29. Although not largely discussed in this Comment, a UIM in Washington state means a motor 
vehicle which, at the time the accident occurs, has no applicable insurance policy covering it, or the 
sum of the limits of liability under an insurance policy is less than the damages the covered person is 
entitled to recover. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030 (1) (2015). In Cedell, the court stated that there 
is a difference between UIM claims and first party claims: “[I]n the UIM context, the UIM insurer 
steps into the shoes of the tortfeasor and may defend as the tortfeasor would defend . . . the insurance 
company is entitled to counsel’s advice in strategizing the same defenses that the tortfeasor could have 
asserted. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 245 (Wash. 2013). In the context of a 
UIM case, “parties contract directly with UIM insurers to provide an additional layer of compensation 
where the at-fault party has insufficient coverage . . . provid[ing] a second later of excess insurance 
coverage that ‘floats’ on top of the recovery from other sources for the injured party.” Hoff v. Safeco 
Ins. Co. of Ill., 449 P.3d 667, 674 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019), review denied, 458 P.3d 790 (2020) (citing 
Fisher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 961 P.2d 350 (1998)). See Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832, 842–43 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987) for a case analysis of attorney–client privilege in UIM cases, or Hoff, 449 P.3d 
667 for a more recent analysis. 
 30. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015(4). 
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deal fairly with the insured, giving the claimant equal consideration 
between the insured’s interests and its own.31 
A third-party claimant is any claimant “or other legal entity asserting 
a claim against any individual, corporation, association, partnership or 
other legal entity insured under an insurance policy or insurance contract 
of the insurer.”32 Unlike a first-party claimant, in most states, including 
Washington, a third-party claimant cannot bring an action against the 
insurer of an insured.33 
The differences between first- and third-party claims—or 
claimants—are important regarding the extent of the applicable attorney–
client privilege. Jurisdictional differences can impact whether the claiming 
party may directly bring a suit against a defendant’s insurer.34 For the 
purposes of the insured–insurer relationship and applicable claims, this 
Comment will focus on first-party bad faith claims and the requisite 
privileges afforded therein. 
B. Pre-Cedell Presumption 
In Tank v. State Farm & Casualty Co., the Washington Supreme 
Court held that, because a quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between an 
insurer and the insured, an insurer “has an enhanced obligation to its 
insured as part of its duty of good faith.”35 In order to fulfill this enhanced 
obligation, the insurance company must meet four criteria: 
First, the [insurance] company must thoroughly investigate the cause 
of the insured’s accident and the nature and severity of the plaintiff’s 
injuries. Second, it must retain competent defense counsel for the 
insured. Both retained defense counsel and the insurer must 
understand that only the insured is the client. Third, the company has 
the responsibility for fully informing the insured not only of the 
reservation of rights defense itself but of all developments relevant to 
his policy coverage and the progress of his lawsuit. Information 
regarding progress of the lawsuit includes disclosure of all settlement 
 
 31. See Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013); Van Noy v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 983 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
 32. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-320(14) (2007). 
 33. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1140 (Wash. 1986); see Ian S. Birk, The 
Cedell Presumption: Discovery of the Insurer’s Claim File in Insurance Bad Faith Litigation in 
Washington, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 503 (2014). 
 34. For example, the claimant’s status as first-party, third-party, or UIM can affect to what extent 
the insured deals directly with the insurer regarding the claim file. 
 35. Tank, 715 P.2d at 1136. As noted in the Introduction, a quasi-fiduciary relationship requires 
the insurer to act in good faith towards its insured and imposes an obligation of fair dealing and 
responsibility to give equal consideration to not only the insurer’s interests but also to the insured’s 
interest. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 504 (1992); see supra text accompanying 
note 15. 
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offers made by the company. Finally, an insurance company must 
refrain from engaging in any action which would demonstrate a 
greater concern for the insurer’s monetary interest than for the 
insured’s financial risk.36 
The Tank court recognized this enhanced duty as particular to 
insurance claims.37 The court reasoned that the fiduciary relationship was 
important because of the contractual relationship between the insurer  
and the insured, the “high stakes involved for both parties,” and  
the “elevated level of trust” that undergirds the “insureds ‘dependence on 
their insurers.’”38 
A year after Tank, the Washington State Court of Appeals addressed 
bad faith insurance claims in Escalante v. Sentry Insurance. The court in 
Escalante addressed the appellant’s contention that an exception to 
attorney–client privilege exists in bad faith litigation, looking to how other 
jurisdictions utilize an exception.39 The court drew from cases such as 
United Services Automobile Association v. Werley, in which the Supreme 
Court of Alaska applied an exception to attorney–client privilege where 
“privilege cannot be used to protect a client in the perpetration of a crime 
or other evil enterprise.”40 This is generally referred to as the “fraud” or 
“civil fraud” exception.41 In Werley, the insured brought a bad faith claim 
against its insurer alleging the insurer wrongly refused to compensate him, 
and without cause to do so, for a loss covered under his insurance policy.42 
The court reasoned that once the insured presents a prima facie showing 
of fraud within the attorney–client relationship, “the other party may not 
then claim the privilege as a bar to discovery of relevant communications 
and documents.”43 
Escalante also relied on Caldwell v. District Court in and for City 
and County of Denver, in which the Supreme Court of Colorado similarly 
declared that an exception to attorney–client privilege applies to civil 
fraud.44 The Caldwell court applied this exception to requests for 
 
 36. Tank, 715 P.2d at 1137 (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1136. 
 39. See Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832, 842–43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), overruled on 
other grounds by Ellwein v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 15 P.3d 640 (Wash. 2001). 
 40. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 31 (Alaska 1974). 
 41. See id.; Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832, 842–43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 
 42. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 33 (Alaska 1974). 
 43. Id. at 32–33. 
 44. See Caldwell v. Dist. Ct. In & For City & Cnty. of Denver, 644 P.2d 26 (1982). The court 
also included a discussion that attorney–client privilege may be overcome by a showing of a 
foundation in fact for civil fraud; accomplished after an in camera inspection of the documents at 
issue. Cf. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28b (Alaska 1974) (declaring only a prima 
facie showing is required to overcome the privilege). 
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production of communications and assessments between the defendants 
(including the insurer) and their attorneys.45 
Almost a decade after Escalante, a Washington court again 
addressed bad faith insurance claims, adopting another jurisdiction’s 
reasoning regarding privileges in insurance actions. The court in Barry v. 
USAA examined two cases from Montana, holding that typically within 
the insured–insurer relationship, the attorney is brought in and “paid by 
the carrier to defend the insured and therefore operates on behalf of two 
clients.”46 The court further stated that “it is a well-established principle in 
bad faith actions brought by an insured against an insurer under the terms 
of an insurance contract that communications between the insurer and the 
attorney are not privileged with respect to the insured.”47 The court tied 
this rationale into the overall theme of good faith and fair dealing with 
respect to the processing of an insured’s claim. An alleged act of fraud or 
bad faith undermines the good faith duty and should entitle an insured to 
all communications made in those actions. In drawing from other states, 
Washington began to develop its foundation for privileges, or the lack 
thereof, in bad faith insurance claims, seeming to point in the direction of 
no privilege. 
II. THE CEDELL PRESUMPTION 
After looking to other jurisdictions to build a framework for privilege 
issues within bad faith insurance claims, Washington laid out its own 
privilege exception in a landmark case. In Cedell v. Farmers Insurance 
Company of Washington, the Washington Supreme Court again addressed 
the issue of bad faith insurance claims and exceptions to an attorney–client 
privilege. Cedell (the insured) alleged that Farmers (its insurer) acted in 
bad faith when it failed to provide coverage for a “likely” accidental house 
fire.48 After Farmers’ adjuster and estimator assessed the damage to be 
over $50,000, Farmers hired an attorney to assist in making the coverage 
determination.49 The attorney sent a letter to Cedell stating that Farmers 
might deny coverage, and offered a one-time $30,000 offer—which 
expired in ten days.50 After Cedell brought an action for bad faith (amongst 
 
 45. See Caldwell v. Dist. Ct. In & For City & Cnty. of Denver, 644 P.2d 26 (1982). 
 46. Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Baker v. CNA Ins. Co., 
123 F.R.D. 322 (D. Mont. 1988); Silva v. Fire Ins. Exch., 112 F.R.D 699 (D. Mont. 1986)). 
 47. Id. at 1176–75; see also Silva v. Fire Ins. Exch., 112 F.R.D 699 (D. Mont. 1986) (explaining 
work product and attorney–client privilege cannot be invoked to the insurance company’s benefit 
where the only issue is whether the company breached its duty of good faith with respect to the 
insurer’s claim). 
 48. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 242–43 (Wash. 2013). 
 49. Id. at 242. 
 50. Id. 
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other things), Farmers produced in discovery a “heavily redacted claims 
file, asserting that the redacted information was not relevant or was 
privileged.”51 Cedell moved to compel the production of the redacted 
documents citing previous Washington cases holding that privilege in bad 
faith litigation is limited and “does not apply to the insurer’s benefit.”52 In 
response, Farmers sought a protective order to prevent the discovery, 
claiming that the sought-after documents were privileged communications 
between the attorney and the client (Farmers).53 
The trial court judge—after conducting an in camera review of the 
documents and legal conclusions regarding the cause of the fire—ordered 
Farmers to provide all redacted documents to Cedell, reasoning that first-
party bad faith claims include a heightened duty to the insured and that the 
insured is entitled to discovery of the claim files without the opposing 
party’s claims for attorney–client privilege.54 The Court of Appeals 
conducted an interlocutory review and reversed, holding that the lower 
court “impliedly found that a showing that the insurer used the attorney to 
further a bad faith denial of the claim was not sufficient grounds to pierce 
the attorney–client privilege.”55 
After accepting review, the Washington Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of discovery in bad faith insurance claims. In its initial reasoning, 
the court noted the importance of access to an insured’s claim file to seek 
the very evidence that would support a claim for bad faith.56 Going further, 
the court explained that 
[i]mplicit in an insurance company’s handling of a claim is litigation 
or the threat of litigation that involves the advice of counsel. To 
permit a blanket privilege in insurance bad faith claims because of 
the participation of lawyers hired or employed by insurers would 
unreasonably obstruct discovery of meritorious claims and conceal 
unwarranted practices.57 
The court balanced the needs of Farmers and Cedell by recognizing 
the broad purposes of discovery in order for parties to gain access to all 
the necessary and relevant information to narrow the issues, and the 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 242–43; see Soter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 130 P.3d 840 (2006), aff’d, 174 P.3d 60 (2007) 
(discussing discoverable work product exceptions including bad faith claims). 
 53. Cedell, 295 P.3d at 243. 
 54. Id. The judge also relied on Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), 
regarding in camera review of bad faith insurance claim documents at issue. Id. 
 55. Cedell, 295 P.3d at 243. 
 56. Id. at 245. 
 57. Id. 
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purposes of attorney–client privilege to disclose all relevant facts to an 
attorney without fear of disclosure.58 
In order to protect and balance these principles, the court ultimately 
adopted the reasoning from Barry and announced that Washington 
“start[s] from the presumption that there is no attorney–client privilege 
relevant between the insured and the insurer in the claims adjusting 
process and that the attorney–client and work product privileges are 
generally not relevant.”59 The court then outlined that an insurer may 
overcome this presumption of discoverability with a “showing that its 
attorney was not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and 
evaluating or processing the claim” but instead was engaged in providing 
legal counsel for the insurer’s own liability.60 Thus, if an attorney is 
actually acting in a legal capacity for the insurer and not the insured, that 
is, acting in a non-investigative role, the presumption may be overcome. 
The Cedell court based this conclusion on the quasi-fiduciary 
relationship between the insurer and first-party claimants.61 If an insurer 
claims attorney–client privilege in order to withhold portions of an 
insured’s claim file, the insurer bears the burden of proof of 
“demonstrating factually” the role of counsel with regard to liability not 
investigation.62 This presumption sets forth an overall rule regarding the 
applicability and use of attorney–client privilege in Washington state. This 
new standard, although derived from previous caselaw, required that all 
insurance bad faith claims receive the same analysis to determine whether 
such privilege will apply. 
A. Post-Cedell Application 
In the years following Cedell, Washington courts have applied the 
presumption in bad faith insurance actions, both expanding and clarifying 
it. This section will discuss the different ways in which Washington courts 
have (1) expanded the presumption to third parties taking over insureds’ 
claims and (2) clarified the limitations on expansion to different parties’ 
statuses. In addition, this section will address the statutory support 
surrounding Cedell as well as the policy rationale for it. 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 246; see Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that 
typically in the insurer–insured relationship the attorney is engaged and paid by the carrier to defend 
the insured and thus operates on behalf of both of them). 
 60. Cedell, 295 P.3d at 246. 
 61. Id. at 245; Birk, supra note 16, at 517. The Cedell presumption specifically focuses on first-
party claimants due to the different duties regarding a third-party or uninsured motorist claimant. See 
discussion supra Part A and supra note 29. 
 62. Birk, supra note 16, at 517 (citing Cedell, 295 P.3d at 246). 
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1. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Justus 
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Justus, the claimant, Robert 
Justus, was on William and Donna Morgan’s property in a pickup truck 
with the Morgans’ allegedly stolen pipes in the back. As Justus drove 
away, Morgan fired nine shots at the pickup, causing the truck to hit a 
tree.63 Two years later,64 Justus sued the Morgans; in the suit, State Farm—
the Morgans’ insurer—agreed to defend the Morgans.65 Eventually, Justus 
and the Morgans entered into a settlement that included “an assignment by 
the Morgans of all their claims against State Farm to Justus.”66 
Subsequently, Justus sued State Farm on behalf of the Morgans, claiming 
that State Farm had acted in bad faith and violated IFCA through the 
assignment of extra-contractual claims.67 While litigating the extra-
contractual claims, Justus moved to compel State Farm to produce the 
claim file for the incident. In response, State Farm asserted the attorney–
client privilege protection because the claim file was under the Morgans,’ 
as the insureds, privilege.68 
The Justus court recognized the importance of the insured’s need for 
access to a claim file to discover the necessary facts to support a bad faith 
claim as found in Cedell.69 However, Justus can be distinguished from 
Cedell in that State Farm was asserting the Morgans’ privilege of the claim 
file, not its own attorney–client privilege.70 The court ultimately extended 
the Cedell presumption “to requests for production of a claim file by a 
third party who has been assigned a first party insured’s claims” and 
remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera review to determine 
if the claim file contained any material protected solely under the 
Morgans’ very specific attorney–client privilege.71 
The Justus court’s ruling extends the first-party claimant’s 
importance in regard to attorney–client privileges—or the lack thereof—
in bad faith insurance claims to third party assignees. It further signifies 
 
 63. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Justus, 398 P.3d 1258, 1261–62 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). 
 64. Id. The two-year time period is significant because Justus sued the Morgans two years after 
the incident, which was after the expiration of the “intentional injury” statute of limitations. Id. at 
1260. Justus thus alleged a claim of negligent wrongful detention. Id. at 1262. 
 65. Id. at 1262. State Farm agreed to defend the Morgans but reserved its rights to challenge 
insurance coverage for any judgments entered against the Morgans. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1262–63. 
 69. Id. at 1268; Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013). 
 70. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Justus, 398 P.3d 1258, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). An in 
camera review was required in order for the trial judge to determine if there was any privileged 
information relating to the Morgans specifically, not to their overall claim file with State Farm 
regarding the incident and determinations therein. 
 71. Id. at 1269–70. 
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Washington courts’ views on the significance of disclosure of claim files 
in bad faith insurance claims. This extension of the Cedell presumption 
takes the presumption a step further into the realm of limiting attorney–
client privileges. Cedell ultimately adds additional avenues around any 
attorney–client privilege between insureds and insurers by allowing 
assigned third parties access to a first-party’s claim file. By extending the 
presumption in this way, it expands the overall importance of broad 
discovery rules in order to sufficiently gain all the necessary facts for a 
claim and emphasizes that importance by allowing otherwise outside 
parties access if assigned the insured’s rights. Although always dependent 
upon the type of relationship and communications made—the quasi-
fiduciary relationship of insured and insurer and whether any 
communications made within the claim file were made due to an adverse 
position based upon potential litigation—the presumption seems to open 
more doors into the claim file than close them. 
2. Leahy v. State Farm Auto Insurance 
In a more recent case involving attorney–client privilege limitations 
in insurance bad faith actions, Washington seems to take a step back and 
set a boundary on how far its presumption extends. In Leahy v. State Farm 
Auto Insurance, Shannon Leahy’s car was struck, and she suffered injuries 
to her back and neck—an accident in which she was ultimately fault-free.72 
Leahy had both personal injury protection (PIP) and UIM insurance with 
State Farm.73 State Farm subsequently denied coverage for some of her 
injuries, then later offered waivers of certain small amounts of its PIP 
subrogation rights.74 After a jury trial over whether her insurance should 
have covered the injuries she suffered—in which the jury ruled in favor of 
Leahy—Leahy amended her complaint to include extracontractual claims 
against State Farm, alleging bad faith insurance practices and violations of 
both the IFCA and Consumer Protection Act (CPA).75 Leahy served State 
Farm with a discovery request for the entire unredacted claim file.76 In 
response, State Farm provided the claim file with significant portions 
redacted.77 The trial court concluded that certain portions of the UIM claim 
file were protected by attorney–client privilege.78 
 
 72. Leahy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 418 P.3d 175, 178–79 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). 
 73. Id. at 179. 
 74. Id. at 179–80. 
 75. Id. at 180. For relevant statutes outlining the Consumer Protection Act, see WASH. REV. 
CODE § 19.86, Unfair Business Practices–Consumer Protection (2018). 
 76. Leahy, 418 P.3d at 181. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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The Court of Appeals, in determining whether the communications 
were privileged, compared the facts of the case to Cedell. In doing so, it 
noted the important distinction that Leahy involved a UIM claim, not a 
first-party claim.79 In a UIM case, “the insured must overcome a higher 
bar before it can discover privileged information.”80 The court explained 
that one way to overcome the heightened bar is by a showing that a fraud 
was planned at the time the privileged communication was made and that 
the communication was made in furtherance of the fraudulent activity.81 
The Leahy court seems to slightly close the wide-open door from the 
Cedell presumption by keeping the difference in party position an 
important aspect of the analysis. Although the Washington Court of 
Appeals in Justus allows an assigned third-party access to a claim file, the 
court in Leahy keeps the barriers to access up on UIM claimants. However, 
the court does recognize an avenue around the attorney–client privilege if 
the UIM claimant can satisfy a heightened bar.82 This suggests that even 
though a UIM claimant is considered differently, the court still recognizes 
the importance of broad discovery and limiting a blanket privilege. In 
some respects, it is arguable whether this heightened privilege is fair, as it 
would be more difficult to show planning of a fraudulent denial of 
coverage or fraudulent activity without having access to the claim file. 
Thus, if a UIM claimant could already show fraud to begin with, it would 
defeat the purpose of gaining access to the claim file. However, this 
position is understandable due to the status of the UIM claimant as 
essentially stepping into the shoes of the tortfeasor and the insurer’s 
necessity of counsel’s advice in strategizing defenses for such a claim.83 
 
 79. Id. at 181–82; Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 239 (Wash. 2013). For a 
discussion on UIM party status, see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 80. Leahy, 418 P.3d at 181 (quoting Cedell, 295 P.3d at 239). 
 81. Leahy, 418 P.3d at 182 (quoting Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999)). The court then asserts the two-step process for establishing fraud in Escalante: First, a 
determination of “factual showing adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that 
wrong conduct . . . sufficient to evoke the fraud exception occurred”; and second, an in camera review 
of the documents shows sufficient foundation in fact of change. Cedell, 295 P.3d at 245; see Escalante 
v. Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (articulating the two-step process). 
 82. Leahy, 418 P.3d at 181–82. 
 83. See supra note 29 and accompanying discussion on UIM claimants. In a more recent case, 
Hoff v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 449 P.3d 667 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019), review denied, 458 P.3d 790 
(Wash. 2020), the plaintiff made a UIM claim against Safeco, the insurer. Hoff, the insured, tried to 
rely on Leahy to argue that the court had discretion to subject privileged materials to in camera review 
in order to determine whether a factual foundation for civil fraud exists. Hoff, 449 P.3d at 675. 
However, the court noted that Hoff was attempting to seek information regarding litigation strategies 
of Safeco (i.e., decisions in removing the case to federal court); Hoff was not seeking information 
regarding valuations like in Leahy. Id. The court once again emphasized the restrictions on the 
presumption in UIM cases. Specifically, in UIM claims a presumption of attorney–client waiver does 
not exist; instead, the classic work-product privileges apply. Since a UIM insurer “steps into the shoes” 
of the at-fault insurer and defends as the prior insurer would, the privilege may only be pierced through 
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B. Cedell and Statutory Authority 
The laws in Washington surrounding attorney–client privilege are 
codified in both the state’s rules of evidence and the Revised Code of 
Washington (RCW). However, although the presumption adopted in 
Cedell is now established in Washington’s common law, is not yet 
codified. Washington’s rules of evidence first recognize attorney–client 
privilege,84 then further identify specific instances of waivers or 
limitations.85 These two rules are fairly common as they are modeled 
almost identically after the Federal Rules of Evidence.86 Although  
these rules are important in the discussion surrounding attorney–client 
privilege in bad faith claims, the interesting part of the discussion arises 
from the Washington statute codifying who is disqualified from  
privileged communications or, more accurately, the statute’s lack of 
specificity therein. 
Washington, unlike some other jurisdictions,87 has somewhat broad 
exceptions in its privilege statute.88 The statute details that an attorney or 
counselor cannot, without consent of the client, be examined as to any 
communication made by the client or to any legal advice discussed in the 
course of legal employment.89 The relevant code does not lay out explicit 
exceptions to the attorney–client privilege other than those modeled after 
the federal rules in Rule 502.90 
 
the crime-fraud exception by a “factual showing adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable 
person that wrongful conduct sufficient to invoke the fraud exception has occurred.” Id. at 674–75 
(quoting Cedell, 295 P.3d at 245). 
 84. WASH. R. EVID. 501. 
 85. WASH. R. EVID. 502. 
 86. Compare id., with FED. R. EVID. 501–02. 
 87. Hawaii’s rules of evidence include a list of specific exceptions from attorney–client 
privilege, such as no privilege for joint clients, preventing crime or fraud, furtherance  
of crime or fraud, and breach of duty by lawyer or client. HAW. R. EVID. § 626-1, r. 503(d)(1)–(7).  
Idaho’s rules of evidence also lay out explicit exceptions to attorney–client privilege. IDAHO R. EVID. 
502(d)(1)–(6). 
 88. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2) (2016) (discussing the types of relationships, including 
privileged communication but without explicit exceptions thereto). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2) (2016) and WASH. R. EVID. 502, with FED. R. 
EVID. 502. Although this Comment does not discuss the implications of the work product doctrine, it 
is interesting to note that WASH. CT. C.R. 26(b)(4) states that documents prepared in anticipation of 
litigation are discoverable only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has a substantial need, 
however, documents produced in the ordinary course of business are not immune. See Escalante v. 
Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832, 842–43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). Work product rules, when dealing with 
insurance claims of this nature, are significant because a possible explanation behind the insured’s 
position in obtaining the insured’s claim file is substantial need since he or she would not otherwise 
be able to obtain the necessary information needed to prove elements of a bad faith action by any other 
means. Further, since normally the claim file is produced in the ordinary course of business when the 
insurer is investigating the claim, it can be viewed as not immune to the work product doctrine under 
such rules. 
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Considering Washington’s reliance on common-law privilege 
interpretations and not on uniquely codified rules, the court in Cedell 
adopted the presumption “that there is no attorney[–]client privilege 
relevant between the insured and the insurer in the claims adjusting 
process, and that the attorney[–]client and work product privileges are 
generally not relevant.”91 Ian Birk, in his article discussing the Cedell 
presumption, explained that the presumption is consistent with the general 
laws of attorney–client privilege, finding that in Cedell, the attorney’s role 
was not solely limited to providing legal counsel.92 After all, the business 
of an insurance company, once a potential claim exists, is to determine the 
applicability of their contract to the fact pattern involved—in essence, to 
make legal determinations of whether the claim is covered under the 
contract and how much is properly owed. 
In Washington, an insurer’s duties are codified under R.C.W. Title 
48, highlighting a strong acknowledgement of public interest: 
The business of insurance is one affected by the public interest, 
requiring that all persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from 
deception, and practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters. 
Upon the insurer, the insured, their providers, and their 
representatives rests the duty of preserving inviolate the integrity of 
insurance.93 
The above statute, coupled with Washington’s privilege statute and 
the Cedell presumption, make Washington’s interpretation of attorney–
client privilege in bad faith insurance claims a logical and easily 
discernable method to understand the complex issues arising from the 
claim file documents and discovery in bad faith insurance claims. The 
Washington State Supreme Court recognizes that denying an insured 
access to their respective claim file would prevent the insured from gaining 
the necessary evidence for a bad faith claim. Thus, if the insured is unable 
to acquire such evidence, it would prevent the insurer from being held 
accountable for its bad faith actions.94 
III. EXTRA JURISDICTIONAL INSURANCE CLAIM PRIVILEGES 
Since many insurance companies operate across multiple states, it is 
important to discuss how other jurisdictions apply similar or contrasting 
opinions to Cedell. The sections below detail how different states deal with 
 
 91. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 246 (Wash. 2013) (citing Barry v. USAA, 
989 P.2d 1172, 1175–76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)); see also Birk, supra note 16. 
 92. Birk, supra note 16. 
 93. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (1995). 
 94. See Cedell, 295 P.3d 239; 35 DAVID K. DEWOLF & MATTHEW ALBRECHT, WASH. 
PRACTICE, WASHINGTON INSURANCE LAW AND LITIGATION § 26:19 (2019–2020 ed.). 
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attorney–client privilege in bad faith insurance claims. As  
discussed previously, all jurisdictions nationwide have some form of 
codified attorney–client privilege; however, as examined through the 
cases below, some of those statutes and their explicit requirements can 
distinctly affect how the courts look at attorney–client privilege in bad 
faith insurance actions. 
A. Paralleling and Adopting the Cedell Presumption 
1. Idaho 
The first instance of a presumption similar to Cedell in Idaho 
occurred in Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse, the 
insured, requested documents related to Stewart Title’s investigation of 
lien claims and decisions relating to coverage, defense, and settlement of 
the claims.95 The court stated that the documents requested fell into two 
categories: (1) “internal documents,” which included Stewart Title’s 
evaluation of the lien claims; and (2) “outside documents,” which included 
documents prepared by the various attorneys working for Stewart Title.96 
The trial court looked to Washington’s Cedell presumption, noting “that 
the insured is entitled ‘to broad discovery, including, presumptively, the 
entire claims file.’”97 The court also looked to Idaho’s privilege rules on 
“joint client” exceptions and determined that they aligned with the opinion 
adopted in Cedell.98 Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(d) states  
there is no privilege under this rule . . . [a]s to a communication 
relevant to a matter of common interest between or among two or 
more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a 
lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action 
between or among any of the clients.99  
Drawing from a leading treatise, the court used its reasoning in interpreting 
the joint-client exception as designed to apply to first-party bad faith 
actions between an insurer and insured.100 In conclusion, the court found 
 
 95. Steward Title Guar. Co. v. Credit Suisse, No. 1:11-CV-227-BLW, 2013 WL 1385264, at *3 
(D. Idaho Apr. 3, 2013). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (quoting Cedell, 295 P.3d at 247). 
 98. Id. at *5; see also IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(5); cf. Evanston Ins. Co. v. OEA, Inc., 566 F.3d 
915, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that where a state’s supreme court has not addressed an issue, the 
court must determine what result the state would reach based on other court opinions, statutes, and 
treatises). 
 99. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d). 
 100. Id. at 502(d)(5); 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5505 (1986) (discussing a proposed—although never adopted—FED. R. 
EVID. 503(d)(5)). The treatise accredits the joint-client exception as the most common use of the joint-
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that Idaho’s codified exception aligned with Cedell, and found that the 
insured was entitled to the entire claim file, without limitation by the 
attorney–client privilege.101 The trial court in Idaho derived its version and 
rationale of the Cedell presumption from an explicit codified exception to 
attorney–client privilege. This justification is interesting due to the 
differences from Washington’s codified privilege statutes that do not 
explicitly lay out such exceptions. The Idaho court seemed to agree with 
the basic premise of broad discovery rules but backed it up by interpreting 
the joint-client exception to support this presumption. In some ways, it is 
arguable that, by the court both drawing from Cedell and using its own 
codified privilege laws, it was seeking to create an important rule with 
which it would be difficult to disagree. 
An Idaho trial court again applied the Cedell presumption 
approximately six months later in Hilborn v. Metropolitan.102 In that case, 
the trial court judge also agreed with Washington’s explanation of the 
presumption. The court relied on the reasoning in both Cedell and Stewart 
Title, looking to whether the attorney in question was working in an 
investigative capacity or providing legal advice on coverage.103 The court 
ultimately presumed that Metropolitan (the insurer), must turn over the 
entire claim file, unless it could show that any documents within the file 
related to the attorney providing legal counsel to its potential liability.104 
The trial court seemed to be reasserting the importance of discovering a 
claim file within an insurance bad faith claim, only implementing the 
privilege when there is sufficient evidence that the attorney was only 
providing legal counsel relating to liability, not simply coverage. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho in Cedillo v. Farmers Insurance 
declined to rule on a discovery issue in a bad faith insurance claim. 
However, Chief Justice Burdick addressed the topic in his dissent, stating 
that when the insurer’s attorney—who was not specifically hired to 
provide advice to the insurer—investigates a disputed claim, the “attorney 
is viewed as simultaneously representing the insured while investigating 
 
client privilege in common law. It further details the “common interest” between the insurer and the 
insured in communications made regarding the defense of the insured. However, that common interest 
only extends so far. Once the communications extend beyond the claim file and onto divergent 
interests, such as claims of bad faith or coverage disputes, those specific types of communications are 
no longer within the exception. This reasoning adheres to the Cedell presumption because it allows 
for an insured to have access to the claim file and any communications made during the claim process, 
only limiting that once adverse action is taken. 
 101. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Credit Suisse, No. 1:11-CV-227-BLW, 2013 WL 1385264, at *5 
(D. Idaho Apr. 3, 2013). 
 102. Hilborn v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-CV-00636-BLW, 2013 WL 
6055215, at *3 (D. Idaho Nov. 15, 2013). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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the claim.”105 Further, this situation cues the presumption of 
discoverability which entitles the insured to the full claim file.106 Chief 
Justice Burdick ultimately declared his strong disagreement by stating 
“[the insurer] nevertheless gets judgement in its favor despite its incredible 
discovery abuses.”107 
As discussed briefly in Stewart Title, Idaho’s codified privilege laws 
lay out specific exceptions to attorney–client privilege, unlike 
Washington’s seemingly broader privilege laws.108 Idaho’s privilege rules 
include an explicit exception for “joint clients.”109 Under this exception, 
communication relates to joint clients when there is a “common interest 
between or among two or more clients if the communication was made by 
any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in 
an action between or among any of the clients.”110 
The courts in Stewart Title and Hilborn interpreted the insurer-
insured relationship as that of joint clients when the insurer’s attorney was 
engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating the 
claim, not providing legal counsel.111 Although the Idaho courts agree and 
apply Cedell’s reasoning, I find it more impactful that the courts located 
the presumption as part of its codified laws of exceptions to privilege. I 
would argue that, by linking the presumption to a specific codified 
exception, the Idaho courts signal the importance of blocking a blanket 
privilege over claim files involved in bad faith insurance claims. 
 
 105. Cedillo v. Farmers Ins. Co, 408 P.3d 886, 896 (Idaho 2017) (Burdick, C.J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. (quoting Hilborn v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00636-BLW, 2013 
WL 6055215, at *3–4 (D. Idaho Nov. 15, 2013)). 
 107. Id. at 899. In this case, the insurer, Farmers, conceded that its attorney was not hired to 
provide coverage advice, but was only involved in routine claim handling and investigative work. 
Thus, Farmers’ attorney was not acting in a privileged, legal capacity and should not have been able 
to assert attorney–client privilege. This dissent furthers the view that even though the court declined 
to rule on this issue in the majority opinion, there is strong backing for a presumption of no attorney–
client privilege due to the importance of the dual-fiduciary and joint representation that occurs in a 
claim coupled with a bad faith allegation, raising serious needs for discoverability that the insurer must 
meet the burden in overcoming. See id. at 893–99. 
 108. See supra Part II.B. for a discussion on the differences in statutes regarding Washington’s 
seemingly broader privilege laws compared to those of states like Idaho and Hawaii, which lists 
explicit exceptions. 
 109. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(5). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Credit Suisse, No. 1:11-CV-227-BLW, 2013 WL 1385264, 
at *5 (D. Idaho Apr. 3, 2013); Hilborn v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00636-BLW, 
2013 WL 6055215 (D. Idaho Nov. 15, 2013); see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 100 
(explaining one of the most common uses the joint client exception is in suits between the insurer and 
insured). 
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2. Alaska 
Alaska addressed a bad faith exception to attorney–client privilege 
in Central Construction Co. v. Home Indemnity Co.,112 where a 
construction company asserted its insurer was acting in bad faith by 
denying coverage to two deceased workers. The court held that “services 
sought by a client from an attorney in aid of any crime or a bad faith breach 
of a duty are not protected by the attorney–client privilege.”113 This case 
signified Alaska’s agreement to the fraud exception to bad faith insurance 
claims and hinted that the state would follow, if it were not already 
implicitly following, the Cedell presumption. 
More recently, a trial court in Alaska in fact did restrict the attorney–
client privilege in bad faith claims by drawing from Cedell. In Heynen v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., the court noted authorities from other jurisdictions 
like Washington, finding that “protected material in insurance claims files 
is discoverable,” and held that the insured’s communications protected by 
attorney–client privilege could be discoverable to the extent they “fall 
under the crime-fraud exception.”114 
Alaska also has express exceptions to attorney client privileges.115 
However, Alaska differs from Idaho by not using a “joint-client” 
exception; instead, Alaska uses the “furtherance of crime or fraud” 
exception to bypass attorney–client privilege in bad faith insurance 
claims.116 Again, absent an established common law presumption, the use 
of an explicit codified exception enhances the significance of the 
restriction on attorney–client privilege for bad faith insurance claims. 
Alaska, while using a different codified exception than Idaho, still 
achieves the same goal of limiting the blanket-privilege insurance that 
companies try to assert. 
3. Illinois 
Illinois has a “common interest” exception to attorney–client 
privilege. “If the insurer and insured shared a common interest in the 
underlying litigation, then the insured is entitled to an in camera inspection 
of the claim file in the declaratory judgement action.”117 The exception is 
 
 112. Central Constr. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 794 P.2d 595, 598 (Alaska 1990). 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. Heynen v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:11-cv-00010-TMB, 2013 WL 12171613 (D. Alaska Dec. 
10, 2013); see also Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013). 
 115. See ALASKA R. EVID. 503(d)(1), (5). 
 116. Id.; see also IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(5). 
 117. Dan D. Kohane, Sean Griffin & John R. Ewell, Invading the Sanctuary Practical Solutions 
to Fend off the Attack on Confidentiality on Insurer Coverage Counsel Communications, 11 No. 2 IN-
HOUSE DEF. Q. 42 (2016). See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 
1991); see also ILL. R. EVID. 502. 
1320 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1299 
similar to Idaho’s joint client exception and the proposed Federal Rule of 
Evidence 503(d).118 
In Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance 
Co., an Illinois court reasoned that in that state, there is a strong policy of 
encouraging disclosure and ascertaining the “truth which is essential to the 
proper disposition of a lawsuit.”119 The court also relied on the common 
interest doctrine by looking at both the insurer’s and the insured’s interests 
in settling or litigating the claims; further that the attorney in some 
capacity has provided joint or simultaneous representation.120 This 
common interest analysis mirrors the joint client exception because each 
party retains similar underlying interests in respect to coverage and settling 
the claims. This allows an insured access to the claim file because the 
attorney, under a common interest in the claim, represents the insured and 
the insurer as to coverage. Allowing an in camera review limits the 
presumption of no attorney–client privilege—as seen under the Cedell 
presumption—but still signifies the importance of the discovery by 
allowing insureds an avenue to defeat the blanket shield. 
4. Ohio 
Ohio, early on, established the importance of discovery of an 
insured’s claim file in bad faith litigation. Similar to Cedell—although 
decided significantly prior—the Ohio Supreme Court held that “in an 
action alleging bad faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is 
entitled to discover claims file materials containing attorney–client 
communications related to the issue of coverage that were created prior to 
the denial of coverage.”121 The court went so far as to note that “claims 
file materials that show an insurer’s lack of good faith in denying coverage 
are unworthy of protection.”122 Ohio’s holding and rationale seems to align 
 
 118. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note100. 
 119. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 190 (Ill. 1991). The 
court also discussed the argument regarding a “cooperation clause” within the insurance policy in 
which the primary purpose is to protect the insurer’s interests and prevent collusion. Id. The court 
explained that the cooperation clause imposed a broad duty of cooperation without limitation or 
qualification and would require disclosure of “communication[s] [insured] had with defense counsel 
representing them on a claim for which insurers had the ultimate duty to satisfy.” Id. at 192. 
 120. Id. at 194. 
 121. Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 744 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ohio 2001). 
 122. Id. (emphasis added). Note that Ohio’s statutory provisions regarding attorney–client 
privilege also do not explicitly lay out an exception for bad faith claims brought by an insured. See 
OHIO R. EVID. 501. However, Ohio does contain a rather specific statute concerning testimony of 
attorneys pertaining to privileged communications. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A)(2) (2016). The 
testimonial privilege established under this division does not apply concerning either of the following: 
(2) An attorney, concerning a communication made to the attorney by a client in that 
relationship or the attorney’s advice to a client, except that if the client is an insurance 
company, the attorney may be compelled to testify, subject to an in camera inspection by 
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with the court in Cedell, highlighting the importance of the “discovery of 
meritorious claims” and not “conceal[ing] unwarranted practices.”123 
Although the supreme court applied this broad discovery, the court 
reasoned that this is because the claims files generally do not contain work 
product (things prepared in anticipation for litigation).124 So even though 
the insured is entitled to the insurer’s claim file, it is not entitled to 
communications relating to the bad faith litigation itself. Thus, when 
insurers make the decision to deny coverage, no work product for litigation 
has yet commenced.125 The court again confirms the importance of broad 
discovery relating to the insured’s decisions in initially denying a claim, 
as that is the very crux of any bad faith action. 
5. Florida 
Interestingly, on the outset it seemed as if Florida courts fully 
rejected the presumption of no attorney–client privilege in insurance bad 
faith claims, however, in a closer analysis, it seems Florida actually falls 
on the side of a presumption.126 Florida caselaw distinguishes between 
what is discoverable in first-party bad faith claims regarding work product 
and attorney–client communications. In Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Ruiz, the 
insured brought a bad faith action against its insurer, Allstate, after she 
was involved in an accident in a vehicle that Allstate accidently deleted 
from her policy.127 Within the bad faith action, the insured requested that 
the trial court compel production of documents, including Allstate’s claim 
and investigative file regarding the insurer’s claim.128 Allstate 
subsequently claimed work product and attorney–client privilege, and 
attempted to argue that “because the problem and dispute associated with 
coverage was immediately apparent when it refused to make proper 
payment . . . litigation was anticipated at all pertinent times associated with 
 
a court, about communications made by the client to the attorney or by the attorney to the 
client that are related to the attorney’s aiding or furthering an ongoing or future commission 
of bad faith by the client, if the party seeking disclosure of the communications has made 
a prima-facie showing of bad faith, fraud, or criminal misconduct by the client. 
Id. 
 123. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 245 (Wash. 2013). 
 124. Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 158. 
 125. This point was more recently examined and affirmed in Goodrich Corp. v. Com. Union Ins. 
Co., 2008-Ohio-3200, ¶ 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). The court noted that although Boone allowed for 
the discovery of claims files by the insured, it does not extend to work product or materials outside of 
those files. Id. 
 126. Florida’s attorney–client privilege statute does not contain an express exception for bad 
faith claims. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2020). 
 127. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 2005). 
 128. Id. A month after the commencement of the bad faith action, Allstate admitted its obligation 
for coverage and its obligation to provide benefits to the insured. Id. The insured, however, continued 
its bad faith claim in the denial of her claim. Id. 
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each of the [insured’s] discovery requests . . . and, therefore, none of the 
material was subject to disclosure.”129 Thus, this case focused on whether 
the claim files—referred to as the work product—were discoverable. 
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court held that 
all materials, including documents, memoranda, and letters, 
contained in the underlying claim and related litigation file material 
that was created up to and including the date of resolution of the 
underlying disputed matter and pertain in any way to coverage, 
benefits, liability, or damages, should also be produced in a first-party 
bad faith action.130 
The court highlighted, just as did Cedell and other cases discussed 
above, that the underlying claim materials are the exact evidence needed 
to show that an insurer engaged in bad faith; thus, those documents are 
treated differently in insurer bad faith claims and discoverable, as those 
materials are vital to advance such an action.131 
Where Florida seems to differ from other states can be seen in 
Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., a later case which 
specifically addresses attorney–client communication privilege and 
whether privileged material is discoverable in bad faith claims. In 
Genovese, an insured sought discovery of the insurer’s claim file and all 
correspondence between the attorneys for the insurer and the insurer’s 
agents.132 The insurer argued that the decision in Ruiz did not extend to 
discovery of documents protected by attorney–client privilege.133 The 
Supreme Court of Florida responded by distinguishing between the 
attorney–client privilege and work product, explaining that the work 
product, or claim file, was discoverable under Ruiz as those materials are 
required for a showing of bad faith; however, the attorney–client privilege, 
unlike the work product doctrine, “is not concerned with the litigation 
needs of the opposing party.”134 Therefore, work product in first-party 
claims is also discoverable under Ruiz; the court noted, however, that the 
exception does not apply to attorney–client communications.135 
Importantly, though, this holding involves a specific situation in which 
such communications are discoverable “where an insurer has hired an 
attorney to both investigate the underlying claim and render legal 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1129–30. 
 131. Id. at 1128–29. 
 132. Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 1068 (Fla. 2011), as 
revised on denial of reh’g, (Nov. 10, 2011). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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advice.”136 So, this opinion does in fact parallel Washington’s presumption 
as it relates to the quasi-fiduciary relationship an attorney may play in the 
claim determination. If an attorney acts in an investigative capacity in 
regard to the claim determination, those communications would not be 
considered privileged communications.137 
6. Montana 
Although Montana seemingly addressed the importance of 
discovering an insured’s claim file when faced with the insurer asserting 
attorney–client privilege, in more recent years Montana seems to have 
narrowed its application. In Bergeson v. National Surety Corp., the court 
stated that the “pivotal inquiry is the manner in which the insurance 
company processed the claim.”138 Going further, the court explains that 
[g]iven the need for complete discovery to be afforded to all parties 
to the action, the interest of justice would best be served by 
bifurcating the bad faith claims from the remainder of the case and 
determining the liability issue first. Following resolution of the 
underlying policy claim, plaintiff shall have access to the entire 
claims file for inspection and copying, and the case shall proceed on 
the issue of National’s bad faith.139 
Montana, similar to Washington, does not have an explicit exception 
to attorney–client privileges as Idaho or Alaska do; however, it is  
similar and even referenced by Cedell as being vested in common law  
that there is a presumption the insured is entitled to the entire claim file of 
the insurer.140 
After Bergeson, however, Montana seemed to tailor back its analysis 
of attorney–client privilege in bad faith claims. In 1993, Montana’s 
Supreme Court found that the attorney–client privilege applied to a 
specific type of first-party bad faith action.141 In this case, the court noted 
that the insurer and the insured were on adverse sides on the outset of the 
underlying case because the insurer “stepped into the shoes of the 
unidentified third party motorist when it denied [the insured’s] coverage 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. The Florida Supreme Court notes that in these types of situations, the trial court should 
conduct an in camera review to determine whether the materials sought are protected in the true sense 
of attorney–client privilege, or whether they constitute investigative communications in preparation 
of materials that would be discoverable under Ruiz. Id. at 1068. 
 138. Bergeson v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 112 F.R.D. 692, 697 (D. Mont. 1986). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id.; MONT. R. EVID. 502; see also Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 
247 (Wash. 2013). 
 141. Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895 (1993). 
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under [their] uninsured motorist policy.”142 Thus, this case presented a 
unique first-party-UIM type case where the insurer’s attorneys were not 
acting in the dual representation or quasi-fiduciary relationship as 
explained in Cedell.143 “The attorneys who represented [the insurer] in the 
uninsured motorist case have not represented [the insured], therefore the 
dual representation reasoning does not apply in this case.”144 
Montana applies a similar presumption to that of Cedell—even 
before it was explicitly set out in Cedell—without a specific codified 
exception to attorney–client privilege, but it also expresses its limitations. 
The necessity of complete discovery, however, seems to be the underlying 
theme across all of the discussed cases. Given that a claim of fraud within 
the insured’s claim file has been made, it repeatedly seems that courts are 
affording the most weight to the fact that, if allowed to assert a blanket 
privilege, the insured parties would be at a distinct disadvantage, since 
only the insurer truly knows what it did and why it did it. 
B. Distinguishing or Rejecting Cedell 
Jurisdictional differences exist on how far asserting attorney–client 
privilege in bad faith insurance claims will succeed. Some jurisdictions 
have altogether rejected the Cedell presumption and some have refined or 
modified the presumption in their own ways. Highlighting the differences 
amongst jurisdictions plays a vital part in establishing why a uniform 
standard is necessary, and why some citizens are vulnerable to a higher 
privilege application in some states than in others. 
1. Hawaii 
Hawaii has directly rejected the Cedell presumption. In Anastasi v. 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.,145 the court stated that an assertion 
of a bad faith claim does not nullify an attorney–client privilege; the rule 
adopted in Cedell is inconsistent with the privilege as codified in Hawaii. 
As codified in Hawaii, nothing in the general terms states that there 
is a waiver of attorney–client privilege with respect to a bad faith claim. 
Additionally, bad faith is not one of the seven explicit exceptions to 
attorney–client privilege laid out in the Hawaii Rules of Evidence § 626-
1, Rule 503.146 Although Hawaii does not explicitly codify an exception 
 
 142. Id. at 905–06. 
 143. Id. at 906. Palmer, however, seems to align with the UIM limitations set out by Cedell and 
other Washington courts. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Anastasi v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 341 P.3d 1200 (Haw. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d in part 
vacated in part, 366 P.3d 160 (2016). 
 146. HAW. R. EVID. § 626-1, r. 503. 
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for attorney–client privilege, it has an explicit exception for  
“joint clients” which is similar to Idaho’s exception although applied a 
critically different manner. 
Although this type of exception to the attorney–client privilege has 
been both examined in common law and used through codified exceptions, 
the court in Anastasi directly stated that attorney–client privilege is 
codified in much more detail than in Washington, and that “nothing within 
the general terms of HRE Rule 503 suggest that the attorney–client 
privilege is inapplicable when a bad faith claim is asserted.”147 Hawaii 
differs from states which have adopted and parallel Cedell in that it looks 
to the exact language of the codified rules and states simply that if there 
was an exception it would have been codified explicitly.148 
2. West Virginia 
West Virginia differs in the application of an exception to the 
attorney–client privilege in bad faith claims in that it discusses specific 
types of documents within an insured’s claim file.149 In State ex rel. 
Montpelier U.S. Insurance Co v. Bloom, the insurer challenged the 
disclosure of coverage opinion letters.150 It was recognized “that an 
insurance company’s retention of legal counsel to interpret the policy, 
investigate the details surrounding the damage, and to determine whether 
the insurance company is bound for all or some of the damage, is a classic 
example of a client seeking legal advice from an attorney.”151 The court 
ultimately found that disclosure of opinion letters was prevented by 
attorney–client privilege because the legal counsel for the insurer was 
performing work of determining policy language, deciphering judicial 
decisions relating to the matter, and reviewing other applicable laws that 
would obligate the insurer to recognize the claims filed.152 
The results of having stricter, more precise situations and documents 
threaded out of this complicated privilege problem seem effective; 
however, I do not agree with the decision here. There is a common theme 
within this problem: the overall importance of discovery in bad faith 
claims. Opinion letters regarding coverage are often sought out to analyze 
the facts and interpret the insurance contract to ensure coverage decisions 
 
 147. Anastasi, 341 P.3d  at 1216–17; see also HAW. R. EVID. § 626-1, r. 503. 
 148. Anastasi, 341 P.3d at 1216–17; HAW. R. EVID. § 626-1, r. 503. 
 149. Similar to Washington though, West Virginia’s views on attorney–client privilege in bad 
faith claims are rooted in common law, as there are no explicit exceptions codified in its rules of 
evidence—like those of Idaho and Hawaii. See W. VA. R. EVID. 502. 
 150. State ex. rel. Montepelier U.S. Ins. Co. v. Bloom, 757 S.E.2d 788, 794 (W. Va. 2014). 
 151. Id. at 795 (quoting Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Lake Cnty. Park & Rec. Bd., 717 
N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Ind. App. 1999)); see also Kohane, Griffin & Ewell, supra note 17, at 42. 
 152. Bloom, 757 S.E.2d at 798. 
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are given the appropriate time and inquiry.153 In a hypothetical thought, it 
would seem that if an attorney’s opinion letter either advised something 
from which the insurance company directly deterred—such as bad faith or 
fraud—or advised insufficient coverage, that very document would be the 
crux of the claim. Although trying to decipher and weed out specific 
situations would help to promote a more understandable standard, simply 
writing off an opinion letter seems too extreme. Instead, I would 
recommend treating opinion letters as not explicitly shielded under 
attorney–client privilege of the insured, but instead, subject to an in 
camera review when asserting a bad faith claim. This would better ensure 
the insurance company did fulfill, or did not fulfill, its obligations to the 
claim file and would allow for a neutral party to decide whether the 
privilege is in fact being in its true sense or as an improper blanket cover. 
CONCLUSION 
The attorney–client privilege, in any respect or area of practice, is 
always seen as one of the most essential and important facets of legal 
representation. As seen in this Comment, many different areas exist where 
upholding the privilege can become tricky and applied in diverse ways. 
Insurance bad faith claims specifically create difficult scenarios in 
deciding whether a privilege applies, as the legal representative is working 
both for the insurer in investigating the claim and, in turn, for the insured 
in a quasi-fiduciary relationship.154 
Insurance companies range from purely domestic—covering only 
insureds within a limited jurisdiction—to nationwide—covering insureds 
across the county—to global—operating to cover insureds across the 
world. The cross-jurisdictional functions of insurance companies make a 
uniform law surrounding privileges in bad faith actions desirable. Larger 
insurance corporations have the ability to, and do, provide coverage across 
all fifty states.155 By creating different legal standards around attorney–
client privilege throughout the nation, it makes national insurance 
operations both a blessing and a curse. On one end, the insurance providers 
 
 153. Michael S. Quinn & L. Kimberly Steele, Insurance Coverage Opinions, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 
479, 485 (1995). 
 154. Birk, supra note 33, at 513 (relying on Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 
1136 (Wash. 1986)). 
 155. State Farm was ranked the No. 1 writer of property and casualty insurance by premiums 
written, the No. 1 writer of homeowner’s insurance by direct premiums written, and the No. 1 writers 
of private passenger auto insurance by direct premiums in 2017. See Facts + Statistics: Insurance 
Company Rankings, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-insurance-
company-rankings [https://perma.cc/VC9P-PQEC]. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company are licensed to provide insurance in all fifty 
states. See State Farm Terms of Use for statefarm.com, STATE FARM, https://www.state 
farm.com/customer-care/disclosures/terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/YZ6Z-9BW7]. 
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need to apply different standards across different states and need to rely 
on different privileges. However, on the other hand, the insurance 
providers are provided greater latitude and privileges in some states over 
others. It seems necessary to create a uniform standard to ensure that all 
individuals, regardless of jurisdiction, are afforded the same rights and 
opportunities for their claim files as, most of the time, these insurance 
providers are the same repeat players (as seen in the cases presented 
herein, the insurers are under all but a handful of names). 
Washington’s Cedell presumption should become a model for a 
uniform view on attorney–client privileges in insurance bad faith claims 
as it embraces the importance of broad discovery and affords the often 
less-experienced insured the ability to bring to light an insurer’s bad faith 
denials. I recommend that one of the following three possible avenues be 
implemented to formalize the presumption articulated in Cedell: (1) a 
codified federal rule of evidence—either an additional provision or 
advisory comment—documenting the presumption found in Cedell; (2) an 
additional provision to the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act 
(UCSPA) implementing the presumption for bad faith claims; or  
(3) an ABA formal opinion or additional comment to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
A. Proposed Codified Federal Rule of Evidence 
First, a codified federal rule of evidence would likely have the 
greatest impact; almost all of the states mentioned in this Comment, and 
around the country, have their respective rules of evidence pertaining to 
attorney–client privilege modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. A 
leading treatise interpreted a proposed Federal Rule of Evidence—
although never adopted—that was identical to Idaho’s joint-client 
exception.156 This treatise comments on the common interest relationship 
between the insured and insurers with respect to legal counsel on the 
insured’s claim file.157 Reviving and codifying the rejected Rule 503(d)(5) 
would cement the presumptions that deal with the vexing problems that 
come about when attorneys represent more than one client on a single 
issue.158 The Cedell presumption of no attorney–client privilege with 
respect to the claim file would go into effect as a joint client relationship 
where the attorney investigating the claim is simultaneously representing 
the insurer and insured in their quasi-fiduciary relationship. 
For example, the proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(d)(5) stated 
an explicit exception to attorney–client privilege: 
 
 156. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 100; IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d). 
 157. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 100. 
 158. Id. 
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(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of 
common interest between two or more clients if the communication 
was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in 
common, when offered in an action between any of the clients.159 
This proposed rule encourages each state to adopt an explicit joint-
client exception. The proposed rule adequately lays out the nature of a bad 
faith insurance claim by highlighting that the insured and the insurer share 
a joint-client relationship under the theory of the quasi-fiduciary 
relationship. When a bad faith claim arises between the now joint clients, 
it would enable the insured to access their claim file which includes the 
communications, documents, and relevant facts created out of the common 
interests between the two.  
B. Proposed Provisions to UCSPA 
Alternatively, an additional provision to the UCSPA would likely 
encourage application of the presumption to a majority of insurance 
companies and create an industry wide standard. Because the UCSPA is 
adopted in some form and extent in almost every state, insurance 
companies would be uniformly advised and aware of the presumption of 
no attorney–client privilege with respect to the insured’s claim file and 
courts would then be able to rely on the industry-wide standard.160 For 
example, a potential provision to the UCSPA could state: An insurer that 
engages in any unfair claims practices, as defined in Section 4,161 is denied 
the protection of attorney–client privilege with respect to the particular 
claim file of the insured who asserts such violation, unless the insurer can 
prove certain communications made, and notes within the claim file were 
made in obtaining legal advice in preparation for a potential defense, in 
which case a court may determine the specific portions to be redacted 
under a legitimate attorney–client privilege. 
Further clarification may be needed, as has been done in some of the 
cases cited above, as to the timing of the files; if the communications were 
made in an investigative capacity prior to or at the final determination of 
denial or other decision in bad faith, such communications are deemed as 
part of the investigative capacity and thus, are discoverable. 
 
 159. 56 FED. R. EVID. 183, Proposed FED. R. EVID 503(d)(5) (not enacted). 
 160. UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, ADVOCACY & ACTION PROGRAM, 50 STATE SURVEY OF BAD 
FAITH LAWS AND REMEDIES (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Final%20-%20Bad%20Faith%20Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PJ4-B89Y]. 
 161. UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 1997), 
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/MDL-900.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSH6-JX99]. 
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C. Proposed Provision to Rules of Professional Conduct 
Lastly, an additional provision to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(RPC) would gain recognition by courts but also would be open to 
interpretation and application at the state level. By introducing this 
presumption into RPC 1.6 (confidentiality), either by laying out a specific 
provision for bad faith claims or by introducing the topic into a comment 
to the RPC, it would allow courts to rely on a recommended standard and 
allow courts to better uniformly apply the presumption—or encourage 
those who do not already.162 In any event, perhaps a comment to the RPCs 
would affect the vast application of privileges in insurance bad faith 
actions. This proposed addition would impose a national recommendation 
to a national area of business. Because all fifty states have a similar 
confidentiality rules to those of the American Bar Associations,163 
imposing a presumption in this manner would similarly have a national 
effect, not only on the future case law but also on the attorneys placed in 
this quasi-fiduciary relationship themselves. 
Insurance companies are large corporations, often operating across 
various jurisdictions and, unfortunately, are currently without a uniform 
rule on privileges between themselves and their insureds. As discussed in 
this Comment, insureds are at a severe disadvantage in cases of bad faith 
claims due to the control of claim files by the insurance company, claim 
files which are essential to presenting a claim of bad faith. Washington’s 
presumption encourages insurance companies to implement practices that 
protect both the insurer’s interest—having the legal counsel specifically 
designate their duties between investigative and representative—and the 
insured’s interest—allowing the insured access to the very evidence of bad 
faith.164 The importance in incorporating this presumption across every 
state is paramount. If the different applications across jurisdictions 
continue, the legal industry will continue to be stuck without guidance in 
an area of the utmost importance, an area in which individuals depend on 
in times of need, but yet, are often left wrongfully denied coverage with 
no way of discovering the very documents to make their case. 
 
 162. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) 
 163. See supra notes 2–3. 
 164. See Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013). 
